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Abstract
This paper presents a discrete formalism for temporal reasoning about actions and change,
which enjoys an explicit representation of time and action/event occurrences. The formalism
allows the expression of truth values for given fluents over various times including non-
decomposable points/moments and decomposable intervals. Two major problems which beset most
existing interval-based theories of action and change, i.e., the so-called dividing instant problem and
the intermingling problem, are absent from this new formalism. The dividing instant problem is
overcome by excluding the concepts of ending points of intervals, and the intermingling problem is
bypassed by means of characterising the fundamental time structure as a well-ordered discrete
set of non-decomposable times (points and moments), from which decomposable intervals are
constructed. A comprehensive characterisation about the relationship between the negation of
fluents and the negation of involved sentences is formally provided. The formalism provides a
flexible expression of temporal relationships between effects and their causal events, including
delayed effects of events which remains a problematic question in most existing theories about
action and change.
1 Introduction
Modelling the dynamic aspects of the world in terms of representing and
reasoning about actions and change is one of the most important problems in
the domain of artificial intelligence. Several approaches have been proposed for
dealing with this problem over the past half century, including McCarthy and
Hayes’ framework of situation calculus17,19, which is probably the most
influential formalism regarding this area. Several extensions to the framework
have been proposed to add temporal features into the situation calculus, e.g.
Gelfond, Lifschitz & Rabinov9, Miller & Shanahan20, Pinto & Reiter21,
Schubert24, in order to enrich the temporal ontology. These formalisms usually
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associate entities such as situations/states, fluents, and actions with some special
time, where time elements are characterised as points and intervals are
constructed out of points. However, these approaches have not gone as far as
one would  like for dealing with temporal issues in representing and reasoning
about actions and their effects, and there are still some problematic issues
which have not been satisfactorily solved.
Generally speaking, the world persists in a given state until some action is
carried out to change it into another state; also, while some actions may be
instantaneous, most of them perform over some interval of time. Hence,
intervals are needed for expressing the time spans of situations and actions. For
instance, in Pinto and Reiter’s formalism21, the time span of a given situation is
characterised in terms of its starting time point and ending time point during
which no fluents change truth values. However, the approach that characterises
intervals as derived structure of points may lead to the so-called Dividing
Instant Problem5,26, that is the question of specifying whether time spans of
situations are closed or open at their starting/ending points: If all intervals
include their ending-points, then adjacent intervals would have ending-points in
common. Hence, if two adjacent intervals correspond to states of truth and
falsity of a given fluent, there will be a point at which the fluent is both true and
false. Similarly, if all intervals don't include their ending-points, there will be
points at which the truth or falsity of some fluents are undefined. Another
approach is to take point-based intervals as semi-open (e.g., all intervals include
their left ending-points, and exclude their right ones) so that they may sit
conveniently next to one another. However, on the one hand, since this
approach insists that every interval contains only a single ending-point, the
choice of which ending-point of intervals should be included/excluded seems
arbitrary, and hence unjustifiable and artificial. On the other hand, although the
approach may offer a solution to some practical questions, there are some other
critical questions which remain problematical (examples are given by Galton7
and Ma & Knight16). The fundamental reason is that in a system where time
intervals are all taken as semi-open, it will be difficult to represent time points in
an consistent structure so that they can stand between intervals conveniently.
The second question is that in those existing theories about action (event)
and change (including that of Pinto and Reiter21, of Miller and Shanahan20, and
of Allen and Ferguson1), which allows intervals (primitive or point-based) as
time objects, the negation of a given fluent and the relationship between a
negative fluent and sentences which involve the fluent have not been formally
addressed. This is in fact a very important issue since we may face the
possibility that some fluents might be neither true nor false throughout some
specified intervals. Additionally, in a logic where some time intervals are
characterised as infinitely decomposable, the so-called intermingling
problem8,10,26 may arise, that is, the possibility of indefinitely intermingled time
intervals within each of which a fluent f takes both true and false values. This
will lead to some difficulties in characterising the relationships between the
                                                Transactions on Information and Communications Technologies vol 19, © 1997 WIT Press, www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3517 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
                                                                                  
 
                                                                      
 
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
                                                                                  
                                                                                  
                                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                        
 
                   
 
 
 
negation of a fluent and the negation of  the corresponding sentence involving
that fluent.
Another question is that, in most of the existing systems mentioned above,
the effects of actions/events have been represented by the results just after
executing actions. Actions with delayed effects have not been successfully dealt
with. In fact, temporal relationship between actions and their effects is quite
complex and interesting. Gelfond et al.9 proposed an approach using the
notation Duration of Actions to describe an action with delayed effects. They
simply count the delay time in the duration of actions. So the actions have been
considered to continue until the results of actions appear. However, this does
not seem to capture the common-sense concept about delayed effects of an
action, which intuitively means that there is a delay time between the action and
its results.
The objective of this paper is to develop a discrete formalism for temporal
reasoning about actions and change which enriches the ontology of the situation
calculus by providing an explicit representation of time and action/event
occurrences. The formalism is presented in section 2. Section 2.1 describes the
main features of the underlying time structure which is characterised as a well-
ordered discrete set of times (points and moments) with no limit elements. In
section 2.2, we firstly introduce the definitely two-valued binary predicate
Holds(f, p) for each pair of a fluent f and a prime time p. Axioms characterising the
closure of the underlying time line are then presented, and the predicate Holds is
extended to govern all times in the closure including the prime times. The advantage
of such a time model is that, on the one hand, since it is not forced to explicitly
specify the starting and ending points of time intervals, the Dividing Instant
Problem is bypassed; on the other hand, since each time in the closure is
characterised as an ordered union of prime times, the possibility of intermingling is
definitely excluded, and hence, the relationship between the negation of a fluent and
the negation of the sentence involving the fluent can be formally well characterised.
A possible state of the world is defined in section 2.3 as a subset of  the set of all
fluents, while a situation is characterised as a pair of a state s and a time t, such
that over time t the world holds in state s. Section 2.4 deals with actions and
their effects, while an event is formally characterised as a pair of an action a and
a time t such that action a performs over time t. Then a short discussion about
frame problem well be given in 2.5. In section 3, we address the problematic
issue: expressing the delay effects of events. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The Formalism
We propose the formalism as a revised version of McCarthy and Hayes’
situation calculus17,19, by extending the ontology to provide an explicit
representation of time and action occurrences. The extended framework
accommodates three disjoint nonempty sets of symbols, P, F and A, called
prime times, propositional fluents and actions, respectively. We shall denote the
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elements of P, F and A as p, f and a (possibly indexed), and adopt the
conventional theories of reals and integers.
2.1 The Time Structure
We assume that the set of the prime times is totally ordered. We use Dur to denote
a function from P to R0+, the set of non-negative real number, so that Dur
assigns to each prime time a non-negative real number, called the duration of
the time. We shall call p a prime interval if Dur(p) > 0, otherwise, p is called a
point. Additionally, we assume that P is similar to 15 Z, the set of integers. That
is, there exists a one-to-one mapping between the elements which preserve the
order relation.
We shall use Meets to denote the immediate predecessor relation over P,
so that Meets(p1, p2) represents that prime time p1 is the immediate predecessor
of prime time p2. Also, we impose the following axiom:
(E) ∀p1,p2∈P(Meets(p1, p2) ⇒ Dur(p1) > 0 ∨ Dur(p2)>0)                     
that is, no two points can meet each other.
From the property of the similar function, we have:
• P is a discrete collection of prime times which is well- ordered by the binary
relation Meets;
• P has no limit elements 15;
• The fundamental time structure is linear, not branching from any time into either
the past or the future;
• The fundamental time structure is unbounded in both the past and the future;
• Circular times are excluded;
It is important to note that prime intervals and points have no internal structure.
In other words the elements of P are all non-decomposable, even some of them, i.e.,
the prime intervals, may have a positive duration. In fact, prime intervals are like
Allen and Hayes’ moments 2 i.e. indivisible intervals.  In this paper, we shall use the
term moment and “prime interval” interactively.
Based on the fundamental time structure, we define the corresponding closure
T whose elements are generally called times, which are not necessarily non-
decomposable moments or points. We shall denote the elements of T as t (possibly
indexed), and use DurT to denote, as the extension of Dur, the function from T to
R0+, so that DurT assigns to each element in T a non-negative real number.
Correspondingly, we shall call a time t an interval if DurT(t) > 0 (Hence,
specially, a moment is an interval), otherwise, t is called a point. We also define
a binary relation MeetsT ⊆ T × T as the extension of Meets, so that MeetsT(t1, t2)
denotes that time t1 is one of the immediate predecessors of  time t2. The imposed
axioms are:
(T1) ∀p∈P(p∈Τ)
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that is T is the extension of P;
(T2) ∀t∈Τ(t∈P ⇒ DurT(t) = Dur(t))
that is, DurT  is the extension of Dur ;
(T3) ∀t1,t2∈T(t1,t2∈P ⇒ (Meets(t1, t2) ⇔  MeetsT(t1, t2)))
that is, MeetsT is the extensions of Meets;
(T4) ∀t1,t2∈T(∃t1',t2'∈T(MeetsT(t1',t1)∧MeetsT(t1',t2)∧MeetsT(t1,t2')∧MeetsT(t2,t2'))
⇔ t1 = t2)
that is, two times are identical if and only if they have the same immediate
predecessor and the same immediate successor.
(T5) ∀t1,t2∈T(MeetsT(t1,t2) ⇒
        ∃t∈T∀t',t''∈T(MeetsT(t',t1) ∧ MeetsT(t2,t'') ⇒ MeetsT(t',t) ∧ MeetsT(t,t''))
By axiom (T4) and (T5), for any two adjacent times, t1 and t2, we may denote the
adjacent union of t1 and t2 as a new time, t = t1⊕t2, called an interval. N.B. t1⊕t2
always implies that MeetsT(t1,t2).
(T6) ∀t∈T(∃p1,...,pn∈P(t = p1⊕ ... ⊕pn))
that is, each element of T is in the form of adjacent union of a sequence of prime
times.
(T7) ∀t1,t2∈T(MeetsT(t1,t2) ⇒ DurT(t1⊕t2) = DurT(t1) + DurT(t2))
where "+" is the conventional arithmetic addition operator. That is, the duration of
the combined times t1 ⊕ t2 is identical to the sum of duration of t1 and duration of t2.
In what follows, without confusion, we shall simply write DurT as Dur, and write
MeetsT as Meets.
2.2 Fluents
We introduce a binary predicate, Holds, over F × P, so that we substitute the
formula Holds(f, p) for each pair of a fluent f  and a prime time p, denoting that
fluent f holds true with respect to prime time p.
Corresponding to the extension from P to its closure T, we also extend the
predicate, Holds, which is primitively defined over F×P, to F×Τ, so that we
substitute the formula Holds(f,t) for each pair of a fluent f  and a time t, denoting
that fluent f  holds true with respect to time t.
However, unlike the prime times of P which are all non-decomposable, an
element of T may be an interval which can be decomposed into a sequence of sub-
intervals/internal-points of itself. Hence, when intervals in T are allowed to be
arguments of the predicate Holds, we will face the possibility that a fluent f might
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neither hold true nor hold false throughout some interval t. That is, it may be the
case that fluent f holds true with respect to some sub-interval/internal-point of t but
holds false with respect to some other sub-interval/internal-point of t. As pointed out
by Shoham25, Bacchus et al.6 and Allen and Ferguson1,  there are two ways we
might interpret the negative sentence ¬Holds(f,t). In the strong interpretation of
negation, ¬Holds(f, t) is true if and only if f  holds false throughout t, so neither
Holds(f, t) nor ¬Holds(f, t) would be true in the case that fluent f holds true with
respect to some sub-interval/internal-point of t and also holds false with respect to
some other sub-interval/internal-point of t. So, this strong interpretation of negation
does not preserve Holds as a two-valued predicate any more. In the weak
interpretation, ¬Holds(f, t) is true if and only if it is not the case that f holds true
throughout t, and hence ¬Holds(f, t) is true if f changes truth-value over time t.
In this paper, we shall take the weak interpretation of negation as the
constraint imposed on the Holds predicate, since it seems to be the appropriate
interpretation for the standard definition of implication and preserves a simple two-
valued logic1:
(F1) ∀f∈F∀t∈T(Holds(f, t) ⇔ ∀t'∈T(Sub(t', t) ⇒ Holds(f, t')))
where Sub(t1,t2) denotes that time t1 is a part of  time t2, and the binary relation
Sub ⊆ T×T is defined as below:
∀t1,t2∈T(Sub(t1,t2) ⇔
   t1 = t2
∨ ∃t'∈T(t1 ⊕ t' = t2)
∨ ∃t'∈T(t' ⊕ t1 = t2)
∨ ∃t',t''∈T(t' ⊕ t1 ⊕ t'' = t2)
Hence, a fluent f holds true with respect to time t if and only if  it holds true with
respect to any sub-interval/internal-point of t (including t itself), that is f holds true
throughout t.
By (F1), it is straightforward to infer that, for any fluent f  and any time t1, t2:
Holds(f, t1) ∧ Holds(f, t2) ∧ Meets(t1, t2) ⇒ Holds(f, t1 ⊕ t2)
that is, if a fluent f holds true with respect to two adjacent times, t1 and t2,
respectively, then f  holds true with respect to the ordered union time, t1 ⊕ t2.
However, in some cases we do not want to express that a fluent holds true
throughout a given time, but only that the fluent holds true sometime during the
given time. In other words, we would like to express the knowledge that, for a
given fluent f and a given time t, there exists some sub-interval/internal-point t’ of
t such that fluent f holds true with respect to t’. Hence, we introduce an additional
binary predicate, Holds-in, over F×Τ:
                                                Transactions on Information and Communications Technologies vol 19, © 1997 WIT Press, www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3517 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
                                                                                  
 
                                                                      
 
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
                                                                                  
                                                                                  
                                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                        
 
                   
 
 
 
(F2) ∀f∈F∀t∈T(Holds-in(f, t) ⇔ ∃t'∈T(Sub(t', t) ∧ Holds(f, t')))
By (F1) and (F2), we can easily infer that, for any fluent f  and any time t:
Holds(f, t) ⇒ Holds-in(f, t)
In this paper, we shall use not(f) to represent the negation of fluent f, to be kept
distinct from ordinary sentence-negation, symbolised by "¬". We say fluent g is
the negation of fluent f, that is not(f), if g satisfies:
∀t∈T(Holds(g, t) ⇔ ∀t'∈T(Sub(t', t) ⇒ ¬Holds(f, t))
and
∀t∈T(¬Holds(f, t) ⇔ ∃t'∈T(Sub(t', t) ∧ Holds(g, t')))
that is, not(f) holds true throughout time t if and only if f does not hold true
throughout any sub-interval/internal-point of t; also, f does not hold true throughout
time t if and only if there exists a sub-element of t throughout which not(f ) holds
true. Hence, for any fluent f  and any time t, by definition we have:
Holds(not(f), t) ⇔ ¬Holds-in(f, t)
and
¬Holds(f, t) ⇔ Holds-in(not(f), t)
2.3 States and Situations
We define a possible state of the world as a subset of F, the set of all fluents.
We can interpret this subset as the set of fluents which are true in that state, all
others being false. We shall denote the set of all the possible states, that is the
power set of F, as S. Elements of S will be denoted by (possibly indexed) s.
For the reason of simplicity, we shall also use Holds(s, t) to denote that s is
the state (of the world) with respect to time t:
(S1) ∀s∈S∀t∈T(Holds(s, t)
⇔ ∀f∈F(f∈s ⇒ Holds(f, t)) ∧ f∉s ⇒ Holds(not(f), t)))
that is, s is the state with respect to time t if and only if every fluent belonging to
s holds true with respect to time t, and for every fluent not belonging to s, its
negation holds true with respect to any part of time t.
By  (S1) and the previous definitions, it is straightforward to infer that:
∀s1,s2∈S∀t∈T(Holds(s1, t) ∧ Holds(s2, t) ⇒ s1 = s2)
That is, with respect to a given time, the state of the world is unique. However,
there is nothing to stop a temporally contiguous time having the same state. In
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order to capture the relationships between states and times, we introduce the
concept of situations. A situation is defined as the state of the world associated
with a particular time over which the world holds in that state. We shall denote
the set of all situations as the binary relation Sit ⊆ S×Τ, such that:
(S2) ∀sit∈Sit∃s∈S∃t∈T(sit = <s, t> ∧ Holds(s, t))
(S3) ∀sit∈Sit∀s1,s2∈S∀t1,t2∈T(sit = <s1, t1> ∧ sit = <s2, t2>
⇒ s1 = s2 ∧ t1 = t2)
Hence, the representation of any situation is unique. In what follows, if sit = <s,
t> is a situation, we shall call s and t its reference state and reference time, and
denote them as State(sit) and Time(sit), respectively. In fact, State and Time can
be seen as two functions from Sit to S and T, respectively. By (S2) and (S3), it
is easy to see that:
∀sit1, sit2∈Sit(Time(sit1) = Time(sit2) ⇒ State(sit1) = State(sit2))
That is, if two situations have the same reference time they must have the same
reference state, and hence they are identical.
For reasons of simplicity, in what follows, we may use Holds(f, sit) to denote that
fluent f is observed as true in situation sit, providing that:
(S4) ∀sit∈Sit∀f∈F(Holds(f, sit) ⇔ f∈State(sit))
N.B. For the convenience of expression, in what follows, we shall call situation
sit a prime situation if its reference time is a prime one.
2.4 Actions and Events
We introduce the binary predicate, Performs, over A×T, so that Performs(a, t)
represents that action a acts over time t.
(A1) ∀a∈A∀t1,t2∈T(Meets(t1, t2) ∧ Performs(a, t1) ∧ Performs(a, t2)
⇔ Performs(a, t1⊕t2))
that is, if an action performs over two adjacent times respectively, then it
performs over the ordered union of these two times.
The world holds in one state until an action is performed over some special
time to change it into another state. We shall call such a phenomenon an event.
Hence, analogously to the form of a situation which are defined as a pair of a
state and a time, an event is given in the form of a pair of an action and a time,
and we shall denote the set of all events as a binary relation, E ⊆ A×Τ, such
that:
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(A2) ∀a∈A∀t∈T(<a, t>∈E ⇔ Performs(a, t))
 Again, analogously to the definitions of the reference state and the reference
time of a given situation, for an event in E, say e = <a, t>, we shall call a and t
the reference action and the reference time of event e, and denote them as a =
Action(e) and t = Time(e) respectively. Then the following axiom ensures that
the representation of any event is unique:
 
 (A3) ∀e1,e2∈E(e1 = e2  ⇔ Action(e1) = Action(e2) ∧ Time(e1) = Time(e2))
Whereas the intuition behind the notion of situation is persistence, the intuition
behind the notion of event is change. To express knowledge about the result of
the occurrence of an event in a given situation, we introduce the ternary
function Result which maps an event, a situation and a time to a prime situation,
so that Result(e,sit,t) intuitively denotes the prime situation immediately after
time t, as the result of the occurrence of event e in situation sit (see Fig.1). Here
we use the prime situation to ensure that the result situation is unique.
sit t
e
Result(e, sit, t)
                                                          Figure 1
 The domain of function Result, Dom(Result), is a subset of Sit×E×T, such that:
(A4) ∀e∈E∀sit∈Sit∀t∈T((e,sit,t)∈Dom(Result) ⇒
    Meets(Time(sit), Time(e))
∧ Sub(Time(e), t)
∧ Meets(Time(sit), t)
∧ Meets(t, Time(Result(e,sit,t))))
This axiom specifies the temporal relationship among situations sit,
Result(e,sit,t) and event e.
N.B. In the above, Result(e,sit,t) represents the prime situation
immediately after time t, as the result of the occurrence of event e in situation
sit. Here, the third argument, t, of function Result which stands between
Time(sit) and Time(Result(e,sit,t)) is needed in order to preserve the uniqueness
of  the result situation. This approach will allow expression of various cases of
temporal relationships between the reference time of an event and the reference
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time of the result situation, including the case where there is a “delay time”
between the occurrence of an event and the result situation (see next section).
2.5 The Frame Problem
Briefly, the frame problem is the need for specifying everything that does not
change. Based on the situation calculus, there are mainly two ways for solving
this problem: monotonic and nonmonotonic. Schubert24 and Reiter22 developed
monotonic approaches to this problem based on the idea of “explanation
closure”. For instance, Reiter provides a solution to the frame problem, using
successor state axioms22. Each such axiom provides a complete characterisation
of a fluent’s truth value in the next state Result(a, s) in terms of what is true of
the state s. Also a number of solutions based on the use of nonmonotonic
formalisms have been proposed4,18. For instance, Baker proposes a
nonmonotonic solution to the frame problem, using the formalism of
circumscription. His work is based on the idea that since the abnormality
predicate takes a situational argument, “it is important for the meanings of the
situations to be held constant across the various models being compared”4. The
major change suggested by him is to employ a new circumscription policy: to
minimise Ab while varying Result and S0 (as opposed to varying Holds, as is
done by Hanks and McDermott11). According to the power of the expression of
this enriched language together with the preservation of the most appealing
characteristics of these existing systems, it is not difficult to extend their
solutions within our formalism. In this paper we will not deal with this work.
3. An Illustrating Example
The formalism proposed in this paper is in fact achieved by means of
synthesising the quintessence of some representative theories, including that of
Allen and Ferguson1,3, Kowalski and Sergot12, Sandewall and Ronnquist23,
Lifschitz13, Gelfond et al.9, Lin and Shoham14, Miller and Shanahan20, and Pinto
and Reiter21, etc. Hence, it is not surprising for us to believe that such an
extension retains most appealing characteristics of these existing theories,
without bearing their corresponding deficiencies. Especially, the new formalism
provides a more flexible expression of temporal relationships between effects
and the corresponding causal events, and overcomes/bypasses the dividing
instant problem and intermingling problem.
 In many cases, the effects of an action take place immediately after the
action performed. However, sometimes there may be some time delay between
an action and its effects. Consider the following example:
 
 25 seconds after a pedestrian starts pressing the button at the
crosswalk, the pedestrian crossing light turns to yellow from red, and
after another 5 seconds it turns to green.
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  In most existing formalisms based on situation calculus and event calculus, this
description can not be represented correctly. Gelfond et al.9 proposed an
approach using the notation duration of actions to describe an action with
delayed effects. They simply count the delayed time by the duration of actions.
For instance, they use the following formula to represent that after 25 second,
the crossing light turns to yellow:
 
 Dur(Press) = 1,
 Dur(a) = 24 ⇒ Holds(Yellow, Result((Press; a), sit))
 
 where the delayed time is represented as action a with a duration of 24 seconds,
while the action affecting the truth value of traffic light is divided into two
actions, Press and a, which perform successively. However, since an action with
some delayed effects actually means that there is a time delay between the
action and its effects, Gelfond et al’s approach seems unintuitive, and not
capable for expressing the knowledge that after another 5 seconds, the light
turns to green. In fact, this is due to the difficulty with such an approach in
dealing with the persistence of the truth value of fluents over the delayed times
involved.
 To express this example in the formalism proposed here, we employ the
following three fluents for describing the state of the pedestrian crossing light:
 
 RedOn: the light at the crosswalk is red;
 YellowOn: the light at the crosswalk is yellow;
 GreenOn: the light at the crosswalk is green;
 
 We assume that in any situation there is exactly one of the three fluents that
holds true. This assumption can be described as a domain constraint axiom:
 
 (D1)
∀sit((Holds(RedOn,sit)∧¬Holds(YellowOn,sit)∧¬Holds(GreenOn,sit))
 ∨(¬Holds(RedOn, sit)∧Holds(YellowOn, sit)∧¬Holds(GreenOn, sit))
 ∨(¬Holds(RedOn, sit)∧¬Holds(YellowOn, sit)∧Holds(GreenOn, sit)))
 
 Let PressButton denote the action of pressing the button, and Sit0 denote the
situation in which the red light is on, the yellow and green lights are off:
 
 Holds(RedOn, Sit0)
 
 Assuming in situation Sit0 a pedestrian presses the button, e.g., for 1 second, let
E = <PressButton, TE>, where Dur(TE) = 1, then we have
 
 Holds(YellowOn, Result(Sit0, E, T1))
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  Holds(GreenOn, Result(Sit0, E, T2))
 
 where Dur(T1) = 25 and Dur(T2) = 30.
 
 Here we can successfully express the fact that there is a delayed time, say TD1,
standing between the reference time of event E and the reference time of the
result situation Result(Sit0, E, T1), that is:
 
 Meets(Time(E), TD1),
 Meets(TD1, Time(Result(Sit0, E, T1))).
 
 Similarly, we can express that there is a delayed time, say TD2, standing between
the reference time of event E and the reference time of the result situation
Result(Sit0, E, T2), that is:
 
 Meets(Time(E), TD2),
 Meets(TD2, Time(Result(Sit0, E, T2)))
 
 Additionally, we can express TD2 as: TD1ÅTime(Result(Sit0, E, T1))⊕T3, where
T3 is the extension of Time(Result(Sit0, E, T1)) since Time(Result(Sit0, E, T1))  is
a prime time and its duration may be less than 5 seconds. The above knowledge
can be graphically presented as Figure 2.
 However, with respect to this expression the frame problem arises. That is,
during the delayed time TD1: does the truth value of fluent RedOn persist?
 
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a discrete formalism for temporal reasoning
about action and change. The main contributions are:
 
 TD2
 TD1E
Sit0 T2
T1
Result(Sit0, E, T2)
Result(Sit0, E, T1)
T3
                                                                     Figure 2
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• The formalism proposed here allows a comprehensive characterisation
about relationship between the negation of a given fluent and the negation
of sentences involving that fluent. Since each time is defined as an ordered
union of points/moments that are non-decomposable, the so-called deviding
instant problem and intermingling problem are definitely excluded.
• We formulate some key terms of the extended situation calculus, such as
states, situations, actions and events so as to ensure “common-sense”
causality. The distinction between states and situations is formally made by
means of defining a situation as a pair of a state and a time over which the
world holds in the state. In a completely analogous way, the distinction
between actions and events is made by defining an event as a pair of an
action and a time over which the action performs.
• A flexible temporal relationship between effects and their causes can be
expressed, including the case of immediate effects and the case there
some delay times between the effects and their causes. It seems that
most existing versions of the situation calculus may be subsumed from
this new formalism by means of simply specifying Sub(Time(e), t) in
(A4) as Equals(Time(e), t).
Hence, while the new formalism retains the most appealing characteristics of
these existing systems, it does enjoy a more powerful expressiveness.
Since the fundamental time model is discrete, it will be difficult to model some
continuous changes from the theoretical view, for which a dense time model would
become necessary7,16. However, if the time model is extended to a dense one which
accommodates both points/moments and interval, some special axioms may be
needed for dealing with the intermingling problem for the sake of providing a
satisfactory characterisation about the negation of fluents and negation of sentence.
Key Words: Knowledge representation, Temporal reasoning, Artificial
intelligence, Actions and change
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